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What	Euroscepticism	looks	like	in	Central	and	Eastern
Europe
In	the	rest	of	the	EU,	Euroscepticism	is	driven	by	particular	complaints	and	resentments	–	some	of
which	are	shared	by	British	Eurosceptics,	and	others	(such	as	unhappiness	at	the	Greek
bailout)	which	are	local.	Simona	Guerra	(University	of	Leicester)	reports	on	a	recent	conference
in	Bratislava,	which	looks	at	the	forms	Euroscepticism	has	taken	among	Latvians,	Slovakians,
Germans	and	Austrians	since	the	economic	crisis.
Public	Euroscepticism	is	persistent	and	embedded	across	the	EU.	It	peaked	with	the	2016	UK
referendum	(FitzGibbon	2013a,;	Usherwood	2013;	Startin	and	Usherwood	2013,	Brack	and	Costa	2012)	and	was
discussed	at	the	EU-funded	CODES	(Comprehending	and	Understanding	Euroscepticism)	conference	in	Bratislava
in	December	2017).	CODES	brings	together	research	partners	from	Austria,	Bulgaria,	Germany,	Hungary	and	Latvia,
coordinated	by	colleagues	from	Comenius	University	in	Bratislava.
While	there	is	no	evidence	of	a	positive	causal	relationship	between	the	economic	crisis	and	increasing
Euroscepticism,	positive	attitudes	towards	the	EU	are	unsurprisingly	declining	in	countries	suffering	most	from	it
(Serricchio	et	al.	2013).	In	new	member	states,	like	Croatia	or	Poland,	young	people	–	the	age	cohort	that	has
generally	been	the	most	enthusiastic	about	EU	integration	–	support	the	EU	less	than	they	did	(Guerra	2018),	whilst
recent	Eurobarometer	data	(2017)	shows	that	opposition	is	still	high	in	Italy,	the	Czech	Republic	and	Greece.	While
the	study	of	Euroscepticism	has	mainly	focused	on	how	it	is	expressed	by	parties	and	in	policies,	my	analysis
examines	public	Euroscepticism,	as	this	has	had	more	and	more	influence	on	the	EU	integration	process.
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The	CODES	research	involved	a	range	of	discussions	and	debates	with	citizens,	NGOs,	local	media	and
schoolteachers	in	Austria,	Germany,	Latvia,	and	Slovakia.	The	findings	established	seven	points	in	common,	and
support	the	results	of	earlier	analysis	on	attitudes	towards	the	EU	and	European	identity.
Across	all	the	case	studies,	positive	or	neutral	narratives	about	the	EU	were	lacking,	with	critical	voices
predominant.	John	FitzGibbon	(2013)	had	already	noted	this,	pointing	to	pro-systemic	attitudes	with	critical
voices	towards	the	current	direction	of	the	EU	integration	process,	and	defining	this	phenomenon
as	Euroalternativism.
In	Latvia	an	emotional	dimension	emerged,	mainly	among	more	extreme	and	negative	positions.	This	was	also
found	elsewhere.	The	focus	of	recent	analysis	after	the	Greek	and	British	referendums,	it	further	highlights	the
impact	of	emotion	on	future	behaviour.
LSE Brexit: What Euroscepticism looks like in Central and Eastern Europe Page 1 of 2
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-04
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/01/04/what-euroscepticism-looks-like-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	CODES	research	group	looked	for	a	possible	cleavage	and	agreed	that	support	for	the	EU	correlated	with
a	cosmopolitan/liberal	category.	This	phenomenon	has	already	been	identified	following	the	elections	in	Britain
and	the	USA,	and	termed	as	the	rise	of	the	well-educated	(see	also	the	Political	Quarterly	Annual	Lecture	by
David	Runciman,	2017).
In	post-communist	countries,	research	shows	that	the	recent	process	of	EU	integration	created	a	mismatch
between	high	expectations	and	low	delivery	–	but	also	citizens’	concerns	about	policy	area	where	the	EU	has
no	voice.	As	Eduard	Kukan	MEP	noted,	there	exists	a	double	language	between	Brussels	and	domestic
politics:	political	elites	can	influence	whether	the	‘blame	the	EU’	narrative	takes	hold,	and	they	need	to	take
responsibility	for	this.
Member	states	tend	to	blame	‘the	other’	(member	states)	for	challenging	economic,	social	and	political
situations.	In	Latvia,	research	reveals	not	just	Euroscepticism	or	Euro-apathy,	but	Euro-conflictedness,	where
citizens	complain	that	the	country	diligently	implements	EU	reform	and	regulations	yet	they	still	need	to	pay	for
or	show	solidarity	towards	countries	like	Greece	‘that	always	abused	the	system’.	This	also	emerges	in	Austria
towards	all	the	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	region,	while	in	Slovakia	it	points	to	both	Germany	and	Brussels:	‘Is
it	moral	to	have	such	inequalities	if	we	want	to	be	a	single	voice/entity?’.
Some	common	narratives,	which	Stavrakakis	and	Katsambekis	have	already	noted	in	Greece,	can	turn	around
the	‘us	vs.	them’	dichotomy.	In	Greece	they	allude	to	the	Weimarisation	of	the	EU;	in	Germany,	they
complain	that	rules	are	not	applied	equally	(‘Is	this	the	Union	of	28	or	what?’),	and	focus	on	the	loss	of	shared,
core	values	and	a	lack	of	solidarity.
All	noted	that	‘remote	governance	is	extremely	difficult	to	communicate’,	and	possibly	communication	needs	to
start	locally,	then	move	towards	the	EU.
These	qualitative	findings	chime	with	a	previous	study	conducted	with	Fabio	Serricchio	(2014),	where	in	a
comparative	analysis	between	Western	and	Eastern	member	states	and	a	focus	on	Italy	and	Poland,	we	found	that
the	utilitarian	model	(cited	in	the	case	of	Slovakia,	but	also	Latvia	and	Germany)	is	most	explanatory	in	the	Eastern
case,	with	Poland	in	line	with	regional	patterns.	In	the	Western	case,	the	analysis	showed	that	identity	and	political
cues	determine	attitudes	towards	the	EU.	(The	table	is	available	here.)	In	particular,	it	indicates	that	merely	feeling
‘European’,	being	born	in	the	EU,	or	being	Christian	are	not	sufficient	factors	for	someone	to	support	the	EU.	The
significant	determinants	our	analysis	underlines	are	these:
(i)	To	respect	EU	laws	and	institutions;
(ii)	To	master	another	European	language;	and
(iii)	To	exercise	citizens’	rights,	like	being	active	in	politics	of	the	European	Union	(voted	in	EP	elections,	at	local
elections	in	another	EU	country).
These	findings	are	corroborated	by	studies	on	the	Erasmus	experience,	which	showed	that	students	enrolled	in	the
programme	were	more	interested	in	other	European	countries	(90%)	and	felt	more	European	(although	students
attracted	to	studying	abroad	could	already	possess	a	more	pro-EU	attitude)	(Mitchell	2012).	If	these	factors	prove	to
be	the	most	significant	determinants	of	EU	identity,	it	suggests	that	–	despite	the	financial	crisis	and	the	refugee
crisis	–	the	eastward	enlargement	of	the	EU	and	the	principle	of	free	movement	have	strengthened	EU	identity	and
public	support	for	the	Union.	Identity,	however,	may	refer	to	the	performance	and	efficacy	of	EU	institutions	as	a	form
of	output	legitimacy.	The	slowdown	of	the	integration	process	and	the	impact	of	the	financial	crisis	can	also	create
different	domestic	tensions	and	dynamics,	as	CODES	found	in	its	Austrian,	German,	Slovakian	and	Latvian	case
studies,	where	solidarity	towards	other	member	states	is	lost	amid	the	perception	that	EU	integration	has	come	at	a
high	price.
A	previous	draft	of	this	post	was	published	on	the	University	of	Leicester	Think	pages.	Forthcoming	in	Simona
Guerra	(2018)	What	is	Euroscepticism?	Unleashing	emotion	in	contemporary	contentious	politics	(Edward	Elgar,
New	Horizon	in	European	Politics	Series)
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Dr	Simona	Guerra	is	Associate	Professor	in	Politics	at	the	University	of	Leicester	and	a	former	Visiting	Fellow	at	the
LSE.
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